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Introduction
Well over a decade on since the rejection of the past regime, a clear pic-
ture has emerged of the public attitudes towards the new democratic order
in Poland. A low level of public satisfaction is present with respect to the
functioning of the current democracy. In May 1995 during a bitter Presi-
dential election campaign, satisfaction with the functioning democracy
fell to 24%1, and as recent as 2001 CBOS recorded only 8% satisfaction2.
The dissatisfaction with the functioning democracy has not however been
reflected in a fall in democratic support. By democratic support I mean the
belief that many parties competing for power through free elections is the
‘best’ system of government available3. On the contrary, as Table 1 illus-
trates, the belief in the current democracy’s superiority to alternative sys-
tems of government has actually raised from approximately half of the
population in 1992 to a relatively stable ratio of approximately two thirds
of the population.
This article sets out to investigate the reasons for democratic support at
times of widespread dissatisfaction. I divide the investigation into the fol-
lowing key fields of enquiry on the subject:
– First I investigate the importance to democratic support of the democra-
tic principle of power.
1 CBOS, Spo³eczna ocena demokracji i instytucji politycznych, BS/59/99, War-
saw 1999.
2 CBOS, (2001), http//www.cbos.pl/ENGLISH/BULLETIN/2001/03_2001.pdf.
3 Democratic support is the cognitive support for a system of government with
free elections and many parties. Note that political support has been divided into co-
gnitive support and its behavioural manifestations, or what Easton terms covert and
overt support. D. Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life, Wiley and Sons, New
York 1965.
– Second I investigate the importance to democratic support of the perce-
ivedeffectiveness of the current democratic regime.
– Third I investigate the importance to democratic support of social and
economic conditions.
– Fourth I investigate the importance to democratic support of percep-
tions of economic change.
Table 1
The pattern of democratic support in Poland
Oct 92 June 93 May 95 March 99 April 02
Best 52% 62% 67% 64% 66%
Not best 15% 11% 17% 19% 14%
Difficult to say 33% 27% 16% 17% 20%
Source: CBOS.
The Case Study
As in any case study, targeting a specific group binds the research to
a particular time and place. The investigation is based on a case study that I
conducted in March and April 1998, a period of relative economic opti-
mism in Poland4. Furthermore, the investigation was limited to a relatively
advantageous group of students at the University of Nicholas Copernicus
(UMK) in Toruñ. My target was a sample of 700 students that were
broadly representative of the university population. To achieve a fair rep-
resentation from the university, I accessed an array of students from across
various departments through the Department of Foreign Languages (LJO
or Lektorat). The Lektorat was an ideal centre for conducting quantita-
tive research because all students from all departments must necessarily
attend language courses at the centre.
The methodology used in the research was a questionnaire consisting
of closed-ended questions in the Polish language that would provide
variables of interest for correlation. The independent variable was the
measurement of democratic support. Respondents answered whether
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4 Between 1995 and 1997 the national economy was growing at an annual rate of
between 6% and 7%.
‘a political system with free elections and many parties is best’5. The
wording in this question was designed to mirror the most appropriate fea-
tures of existing support measurements. The question avoided the usage of
the politically loaded term ‘democracy’, and respondents stated whether
they favoured a democracy over ‘all’ alternatives. The choice of answers
was ordinal. Respondents chose whether democracy is ‘certainly best’
(strong supporters), ‘rather better’ (weak supporters), ‘rather not better’
(weak non-supporters), ‘certainly not best’ (strong non-supporters) or that
they ‘didn’t know’ (undecided)6.
In total 79.5% of the students were ‘supporters’ of democracy. This
percentage of supporters can be compared with a national average in 1997
of 63%7, indicating that the group sampled is more favourable to democ-
racy than the average cross section of Polish society. Despite the sample
group being largely supportive of democracy, the majority of respondents
were not ‘strong supporters’, which indicated a significant level of doubt.
33% were weak supporters, 13.8% were ‘undecided’ and 6.8% were
non-supporters (‘rather not better’ or ‘certainly not best’).
Part 1. The Support Significance of the Principle of Democracy
In Part 1 the support significance of the democratic principle of power
is tested. The principle under investigation is the core democratic idea of
‘power through/by the people’. To measure this principle the participants
expressed their ‘preferred distribution of power across society’.
Figure 1 illustrates that respondents’ power preference was generally
in favour of more political control by citizenry than by elite. This ‘demo-
cratic’ orientation was to be expected from the sample group. Poland pos-
sesses a long democratic heritage that is not only felt most strongly across
educated circles, but was also revived in the spirit of empowerment during
the 1970s and 1980s. However, the cross-tabulations in Table 2 show an
absence of a positive relationship between supporters of democracy and
believers in the principle of democracy (Correlation coefficient is –.05).
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5 The Polish translation for the support question was as follows: ‘Generalnie, czy
uwa¿asz, ¿e najlepszym ustrojem politycznym jest ustrój z wolnymi wyborami i wie-
loma partiami?’
6 The Polish translation for the choice of answers was ‘zdecydowanie tak’, ‘raczej
tak’, ‘raczej nie’, ‘zdecydowanie nie’ and ‘nie wiem’.
7 CBOS, Spo³eczna Stosunek do Demokracji, BS/152/152/97, Warsaw 1997.
Table2
Relationship between ‘democratic support’ and ‘power preference’
Value Std. Error Level of sig. No
Pearson chi-square 2.55 – >.05 555
Correlation coefficient
(Spearman’s rho)
–.05 .04 >.05 555
Those ‘undecided’ about their power preference are removed from the calculation, hence the low
number.
The lack of a positive relationship might best be explained through
a widely conceived gap between the ‘principle’ and ‘practice’ of democ-
racy8 or, alternatively, by the perspective that democratic principles appeal
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Figure 1. Belief in public empowerment
8 Respondents may ‘in principle’ support ideas of public empowerment, but ‘in
practice’ there is a historically rooted sense of powerlessness in Poland. Even by 2000
82% believed that they could not influence what was going on in the country. CBOS,
(2000), http//www.cbos.pl/ENGLISH/BULLETIN/2000/01_2000.pdf.
without being highly valued9. However one wishes to explain the absence
of a positive relationship, the underlining factor of importance is that the
results indicate that democratic support cannot be founded on a belief in
the democratic principle of power, and hence cannot explain democratic
support at a time of widespread dissatisfaction with the functioning de-
mocracy.
Part2. The Support Significance of Perceptions of Effectiveness
In Part 2 of the research I will test whether, despite the widespread
dissatisfaction with the functioning democracy, the current democratic
system is perceived as effective in comparison to alternative political sys-
tems. I will follow this with an evaluation of the support significance of
the perceived effectiveness of the current democratic regime, hence indi-
cating the extent of the instrumental foundations to democratic support.
Two measurements of effectiveness were used in the investigation: per-
ceived effectiveness in the economy and perceived effectiveness in law and
order. As illustrated in Figure 2, the current system is widely perceived as
effective in comparison to alternative political systems. Furthermore, many
of those who were not positive were undecided (don’t know) rather than
negative (‘rather not best’or ‘certainly not best’). One particular point of in-
terest however is the difference between the two fields of effectiveness.
Concern over crime10 seems to have resulted in a weaker belief in ‘law and
order effectiveness’. Despite 53.6% believing in the current system’s supe-
riority in dealing with law and order, only 15.5% of those sampled were
‘certain’ of its effectiveness. Moreover, 25.2% of the total number of re-
sponses was negative about ‘law and order effectiveness’, which contrasted
with only 8.9% that was negative about ‘economic effectiveness’.
The perceptions of effectiveness were significantly related to demo-
cratic support. Table 3 shows a correlation coefficient of .52 with respect
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9 Interestingly, approximately half of respondents in 2000 rejected the importance to
democracy of ‘active participation in political life’. CBOS, (2000), http//www.cbos.pl/EN-
GLISH/BULLETIN/2000/08_2000.pdf.
10 In 1995 57% of those responding to a CBOS poll felt more threatened by crime
in a democratic country rather than in a non-democratic country. In contrast, only 23%
felt safer in a democratic country CBOS. Spo³eczna wizja ustroju demokratycznego,
BS/118/99/95, Warsaw 1995.
to economic effectiveness, and Table 4 shows a slightly weaker correla-
tion coefficient of .47 with respect effectiveness in law and order. Also of
interest is that, when controlling for ‘law and order effectiveness’, the co-
efficient between ‘democratic support’ and ‘economic effectiveness’ fell
to a significantly lesser extent than when controlling for ‘economic effec-
tiveness’ (.37 and .27 respectively). Therefore, the perception of econo-
mic effectiveness is not only a highly significant support factor, but one
that is of greater significance than perceptions of effectiveness in law and
order. This accordingly indicates that democratic support has strong in-
strumental (economic) foundations that do not appear to have been signifi-
cantly eroded by widespread political dissatisfaction.
Table 3
Relationship between ‘democratic support’ and ‘perception of economic effectiveness’
Value Std. Error Level of sig. No
Pearson chi-square 225.67 – <.001 696
Correlation coefficient (Spearman’s rho) .52 .03 <.001 696
Partial correlation – Controlling for law
and order effectiveness
.37 – <.001 692
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Figure 2. Perceptions of the effectiveness of the current democracy
Table4
Relationship between ‘democratic support’ and ‘perception of effectiveness in law
and order’
Value Std. Error Level of sig. No
Pearson chi-square 171.0
6
– <.001 695
Correlation coefficient (Spearman’s rho) .47 .03 <.001 695
Partial correlation – Controlling for
economic effectiveness
.27 – <.001 692
Part 3. The Support Significance of Social
and Economic Conditions
Social factors
In the investigation social factors were not significantly related to de-
mocratic support. There was a slight tendency for the strongest supporters
of democracy to come from large towns and to have a weak religious/Ca-
tholic commitment but, as Table 5 illustrates, the relationships were weak
(.06 for religious commitment and .09 for size of hometown)11. Instead,
gender proved to be a far more significant support factor, with females less
likely than males to have a favourable attitude towards democracy (Corre-
lation coefficient is .17). Why might this gender difference occur? From
a social perspective, it has been argued that women are more supportive
of authoritarian values. However, the gender factor is better explained
through an argument founded on female uncertainty because females were
not so much ‘against’ democracy as ‘undecided’ about democracy. 17.8%
of females were undecided, in contrast to only 5.6% of males12.
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11 Further research also shows that the general tendency is for those from the coun-
tryside to be more ‘uncertain’ in their support attitudes. See CBOS, Spo³eczna ocena
demokracji i instytucji politycznych, BS/59/99, Warsaw 1999.
12 A slight tendency for female ‘uncertainty’ can be observed in other studies. 20%
of women from a CBOS survey from 1999 were unable to say whether democracy is
a better system of government, which contrasted with 12% of men. CBOS, Spo³eczna
ocena demokracji i instytucji politycznych, BS/59/99, Warsaw 1999.
Table5
Relationships between democratic support and social factors
Spearman’s rho Value Std. Error Level of sig. No
Religious Commitment .06 .04 >.05 691
Size of Hometown Population .09 .04 <.05 697
Gender –.17 .04 <.01 697
Economic Conditions
For the investigation on economic conditions two family wealth varia-
bles were tested: ‘existing level of family wealth’ and ‘changes to family
wealth since 1989’13. The decision to measure ‘family’ wealth was based
on the presumption that students had experienced most of their lives in the
economic conditions of their family. However, as Table 6 illustrates, the
strength of the support relationships was weak with respect to both ‘exi-
sting wealth’ and ‘changing wealth’ (Correlation coefficient .07 and .1 re-
spectively). This suggests that factors relating to experienced economic
conditions are, for these students, only a minor support factor.
A certain point of interest can be induced from the difference between
the two tested variables. ‘Change in family wealth’ was with a stronger
support relationship than ‘current family wealth’, which suggests that exi-
sting levels of economic wealth have not been as important to democratic
support as the associated change in economic conditions. The relevance to
democratic support of ‘change in economic conditions’ is supported by
other findings. Rychard has stressed the support significance of being a
winner rather than a loser in economic change14. Indeed, in a CBOS su-
rvey from 1998 76% of winners were supporters of democracy whereas
46% of losers were supporters15. But, with almost half of ‘losers’ still
supporting democracy, the relationship should not be exaggerated.
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13 For measuring ‘existing family wealth’ I lessened the margin of error by measu-
ring both the ‘comparative level of family wealth’ and the ‘existing financial situatio-
n’. These two sets of responses were then collapsed into a single scale. For measuring
‘changes to family’s wealth’, I targeted the change in the family’s purchasing power
since the transfer of power in 1989.
14 A. Rychard, Beyond Gains and Losses: In Search of Winning Losers, „Social
Research” 1996, 63:2, p. 645–85.
15 CBOS, Spo³eczna ocena demokracji, BS/78/78/98, Warsaw 1998.
Table6
Relationships between democratic support and economic circumstances
Spearman’s rho Value Std. Error Level of sig. No
Existing family wealth .07 .04 >.05 593
Changes to family wealth .10 .04 <.01 696
Experience of entertainment .11 .04 <.01 697
Partial correlation – Experience of enterta-
inment when controlling wealth variables
.03 – >.05 588
Experience of foreign travel .09 .04 <.05 697
Partial correlation – Experience of foreign
travel when controlling wealth variables
.6 – >.05 588
The support significance of experience in the revitalised leisure
economy was also tested. Two variables were used: a ‘travel’ variable
based on the extent of foreign travel and ‘entertainment’ variable based
on how often such places as bars, restaurants, clubs and cinemas were
visited. The results showed that the ‘foreign traveller’ was more likely
than the ‘non-traveller’ to support democracy, and that those experi-
encing the most entertainment were most likely to support democracy.
However, as with family wealth variables, the support significance was
weak (.09 for foreign travel and .11 for entertainment). Furthermore,
the data indicates that the experience of the leisure economy does not
relate to democratic support independent of family wealth. When con-
trolling for the two family wealth variables, the strength of the support
relationships fell significantly. Hence, the results do not indicate
a qualitative influence on democratic support based on enjoyment of
the leisure economy.
The results show that the democratic support significance of economic
conditions is limited, especially with respect to this group of university
students who might arguably be said to focus on their future as much as
their past or present. One point of interest however has been the sugge-
stion that existing levels of economic wealth are not as important to demo-
cratic support as being/feeling a ‘winner’ under transition. Accordingly,
this raises an interest in the support significance of perceptions of the on-
going economic changes.
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Part4. The Support Significance of Perceptions
of Economic Change
Due to the past regime’s deep reluctance to relinquish economic con-
trol during the 1980s, the economic liberalisation programme in Poland
has largely been associated with the ongoing policy of democratically
elected governments. Indeed, the Solidarity Movement packaged the pro-
cess of democratisation and economic liberalisation closely together,
which led to a holistic understanding of political and economic transition.
These holistic associations have faded over time, and by 1997 a sizeable
minority of citizens had come to actually believe that democracy is coun-
ter-productive to the goal of liberalising the economy. In a CBOS poll
from 1997, 23% of those polled believed that democracy postponed ne-
cessary economic reform16. Nevertheless, with consecutive democratic
governments continuing to liberalise different sectors of the economy in
preparation for EU membership, it is perhaps unavoidable that continued
economic liberalisation remains associated with the new democratic or-
der.
The support significance of the preferred direction of economic change
In this section I investigate the support significance of a belief in eco-
nomic liberalisation. I measure the preferred direction of state expenditure
in areas of welfare (Towards higher or lower levels of taxation/expenditu-
re in such fields as education and health). I also measure the preferred
direction of ownership (Towards more private or public ownership).
Table 7 shows that the attitudes towards state expenditure are unrelated
to democratic support (Correlation coefficient is –.02). In contrast,
a strong relationship exists between democratic support and preferred di-
rection of ownership (correlation coefficient is strong at .32). Those who
favoured an increase in private ownership were significantly more likely
to be supporters of democracy than those who favoured an increase in pub-
lic ownership17. Might such a relationship be spurious? The rejection of
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16 CBOS, Funkcjonowanie demokracji w Polsce, BS/14/14/97, Warsaw 1997.
17 Amongst others, Whitfield and Evans record a general relationship between ‘de-
mocratic support’ and ‘support for marketisation’. S. Whitefield and G. Evans, The
Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment – Support for Democracy in Tran-
sitional Societies, „British Journal of Political Science” 1995, 25:4, p. 485–514.
communism during the 1980s generally paralleled the rejection of the po-
litical and economic status quo; hence both democratic support and own-
ership belief might flow from the same rejection of the old regime. Partial
correlation however indicates that ownership belief should not be ignored.
When controlling for ‘perceived economic effectiveness of the current de-
mocracy’, the strength of the relationship between ‘democratic support’
and ‘ownership belief’ significantly falls (See Table 7). This would sug-
gest that belief in private ownership relates to democratic support by rein-
forcing a belief in the economic effectiveness of the democratic system.
Table7
Relationships between democratic support and belief in the direction of economic change
Spearman’s rho Value Std. Error Level of sig. No
Belief in direction of ownership .32 .04 <.001 693
Partial correlation – Belief in direc-
tion of ownership when controlling
for economic effectiveness
.14 – <.01 682
Belief in direction of state expendi-
ture
–.02 .04 >.05 692
The implication from these results is that economic beliefs have
a largely positive impact on democratic support because in Poland there is
broad support for the private ownership with which democracy is associ-
ated18. Certainly there is widespread concern over the relaxation of the
protective role of the state, particularly with the recent slowdown of the
economy and rise in unemployment19. Yet, with preferred levels of state
expenditure unrelated to democratic support, the implication is that atti-
tudes towards the protective role of the state do not impact democratic
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18 Though the educated sample group would be expected to have a disproportiona-
tely favourable attitude towards the free market, the majority of Poles have come to be-
lieve in the market forces. A figure of 39% who favoured the power of manufacturers
over the state in 1985 had by 1998 increased to a figure of 61%. CBOS, Pañstwo a ry-
nek – pogl¹dy Polaków po 13 latach, BS/149/149/98, Warsaw 1998.
19 Even in my own study of supposedly liberal-minded university students, a wide-
spread support for private ownership was not matched by widespread support for re-
ductions in state expenditure in welfare. Whereas 65.3% of respondents favoured an
increase in private ownership, approximately half of those surveyed rejected any re-
duction in state expenditure.
support20. So, whereas democracy has gained support through an accom-
panying belief in private ownership, it has not significantly lost support
through concerns over the relaxation of the protective role of the state.
Such an interpretation however must be put into context. Any belief in the
direction of private ownership cannot be expected to reinforce democratic
support in isolation from the real or perceived effects of those changes on
the individual. In Part 3 I suggested the importance to democratic support
of being a winner under the economic changes. In the next section I inves-
tigate the support significance of the perception that one will become
a winner by the economic changes.
The support significance of the perceived effect of change on the future
In this section I investigate the support significance of the perceived
effect of economic change on ‘future income’ and ‘future job security’.
The results showed that those who believed that economic change would
positively effect their future work situations were the most likely to
support democracy. The relationship with ‘future income’ was significan-
tly stronger than that with future job security (Table 8 illustrates correla-
tion coefficients of .17 and .1 respectively). Furthermore, the importance
of ‘job security’ could not be treated as a significant support factor inde-
pendent of ‘future income’ because, when controlling for ‘future income’,
the coefficient with ‘future job security’ fell to .05.
The support significance of ‘future income’ is not altogether surpri-
sing, especially for a group of university students who, at least in theory,
are focusing on their future. Also, in Poland this ‘future’ perspective has
been particularly important with Polish society being described by Tar-
kowska as a ‘waiting society’because of historic experience21. Furthermo-
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20 Poles have consistently understood democracy as having a social component. In
2000 approximately three in four of respondents described important characteristics of
democracy as ‘guaranteeing a minimum standard of living’ and ‘financing health se-
rvice, science and culture by the state’. CBOS, (2000), http//www.cbos.pl/EN-
GLISH/BULLETIN/2000/08_2000.pdf. Furthermore, the mechanism of democracy
has arguably allowed the existing political system to remain associated with a social
role because citizens’ votes have resulted in political players who have followed
a ‘gradualist’ approach to economic liberalisation.
21 E. Tarkowska, A Waiting Society: The Temporal Dimension of Transformation
in Poland, “Polish Sociological Bulletin” 1993, 102:2, p. 93–102. Due to the high
re, results from various other studies have indicated a significant
relationship between positive economic expectations and positive evalu-
ations of the political system22. The belief that one ‘will be a winner’ is se-
emingly as significant to democratic support as the belief that one ‘is
a winner’. These results however indicate more than the support signifi-
cance of future expectations. They also illustrate the importance to demo-
cratic support of the perceived impact of the economic changes on the
individual.
Table8
Relationships between democratic support and the perceived impact of economic change
on future work situation
Spearman’s rho Value Std. Error Level of sig. No
Impact on future income .17 .04 <.001 696
Impact on future job security .10 .04 <.01 695
Partial Correlation – Impact
on future job security when
controlling for future income
.05 – >.05 691
Conclusion
The findings from the case study do not provide a complete explana-
tion of democratic support. There is not one determining factor that can
explain support, and the empirical study has targeted specific support
explanations. The findings must also be understood in the context of a gro-
up of Polish university students at a period of relative economic optimism.
These students are not a representative group of the whole Polish nation.
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levels of tolerance to difficult economic conditions, some social scientists have stres-
sed the importance of a ‘hope factor’ across the region. See R. Rose and W. Mishler,
Trajectories of Fear and Hope-Support for Democracy in Post-communist Europe,
„Comparative Political Studies” 1996, 28:4, p. 553–581.
22 See K. Zagórski, Hope Factor, Inequality, and Legitimacy of Systemic Transfor-
mations – The Case of Poland, „Communist and Post-communist Studies” 1994, 27:4,
p. 357–376. Similarly, Markowski found a strong relationship between ‘trust in institu-
tions’ and ‘prospects for the future’. R. Markowski, Trust in Institutions in East Cen-
tral Europe at the Beginning of Transformation, in: A. Bozoki ed., Democratic
Legitimacy in Post-communist Societies, T-Twins, Budapest 1994.
Nevertheless, the empirical investigation has offered an insight into the re-
asons for democratic support.
The findings provided no evidence to indicate that democratic support
is significantly founded on a belief in the democratic principle of power.
Despite the appeal of public empowerment in the decision making pro-
cess, this appeal does not relate to democratic support. Instead the findings
indicate that democratic support is largely founded on instrumental fac-
tors, most notably with respect to economic factors. The economic factors
that are most closely related to democratic support are those relating to the
perceived (future) impact of economic change on the individual, rather
than existing economic conditions/experiences. This in itself is of value
observing, though the importance of the subjective over the objective
should not be overstressed. During the first decade under the transition
process democracy unavoidably became associated with individual hopes
and expectations from economic liberalisation. Also, the case study sam-
pled a group of university students who might be influenced by economic
beliefs and expectations as much as their immediate material reality.
I conclude this article with a short discussion on the current implica-
tions of using a broad economic logic for the explanation of democratic
support. As Table 1 illustrates, in the early 1990s support for democracy
and the economy were at a low following the initial effects of freeing price
controls. By the middle of the decade the situation had significantly im-
proved along with people’s optimism as the economy grew at an annual
rate of 5–7%. Yet, since the late 1990s the economic situation has signifi-
cantly worsened with growth stagnant and official unemployment figures
approaching 20% by 2002. Accordingly, attitudes towards the direction of
change have hardened with only 38% in 2001 stating that the introduction
of the free market had been beneficial to the country23. Certainly the extent
of the economic difficulties should not be over-exaggerated with wide so-
ciety still able to associate democracy with a prosperity that was so absent
under the previous political regime24. However, the research does indicate
that widespread democratic support should not be taken for granted, espe-
cially if a period of prolonged economic hardship erodes belief in the future.
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23 CBOS (2001), http//www.cbos.pl/ENGLISH/BULLETIN/2001/03_2001.pdf.
24 The percentage satisfied with their material situation rose to 60% by 2001.
CBOS (2001), http//www.cbos.pl/ENGLISH/BULLETIN/2001/12_2001.pdf.
Streszczenie
Artyku³ poœwiêcono ocenie przyczyn popierania demokracji w okresach niezado-
wolenia z jej praktycznego funkcjonowania. Ocenê oparto o studium przypadku pol-
skich studentów uniwersyteckich. Rezultaty badañ wskazuj¹, ¿e poparcie dla
demokracji wynika z instrumentalnej wiary w porównywaln¹ skutecznoœæ systemu,
raczej ni¿ z demokratycznej zasady si³y. Dalsze wyniki wskazuj¹ na znaczenie po-
strzeganego wp³ywu przemian ekonomicznych dla popierania demokracji.
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